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I.

INTRODUCTION

The conduct that resulted in the State of Montana charging
Kingsley Ariegwe with felony and misdemeanor sexual offenses
probably constituted a few hours of his life. One year and six continuances later, Ariegwe moved the district court to dismiss the
case against him on grounds the delay violated his constitutional
right to a speedy trial.1 The court denied his motion and the case
proceeded to trial, where a jury found him guilty of attempted sexual intercourse without consent and unlawful transactions with
children. 2 The court sentenced Ariegwe to fifty years in the Mon3
tana State Prison.
Ariegwe appealed his convictions to the Montana Supreme
Court, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred
in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. 4 Although the Court ultimately rejected his appeal, in doing so it recognized an opportunity to revisit almost a decade of speedy trial
jurisprudence. 5 When the dust settled-or rather, the typing
ceased-Montana would have a "new" right to speedy trial analysis feared by one justice to be "the mother of all balancing tests. ''6
The new analysis began promisingly, with a return to the
sparse balancing test promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Barker v. Wingo7 in 1971. However, the Court did not stop there.
Rather, it proceeded to flesh out that test with an extraordinary
amount of detail. Ultimately, in its struggle to achieve greater
consistency and clarity, the Court may have sacrificed the "necessarily relative"8 nature of a right the U.S. Supreme Court "ha[s]
deemed fundamental,"9 while achieving little, if any, greater consistency.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

State v.Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 825 (Mont. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 864 (Rice, J., concurring).
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1971).
Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
Barker, 407 U.S. at 529-30.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January 2003, Kingsley Ariegwe was a thirty-five-year-old
youth counselor living with his ex-wife and their two children. 10
On January 17, he brought to his home a fifteen-year-old girl,
"K.M.", whom he had met in an Internet chat room two days earlier." While Ariegwe and the girl provided dramatically differing
2
testimony as to what happened in Ariegwe's basement that day,'
the girl subsequently told her parents she had an involuntary sexual encounter with Ariegwe.' 3 Upon learning that police were investigating him, Ariegwe turned himself in, thinking they wanted
to talk to him about giving K.M. alcohol.' 4 Police arrested him
and detained him for four days, until he posted bond and was re15
leased.
On February 7, 2003, the State of Montana charged Ariegwe
with felony sexual intercourse without consent and misdemeanor
unlawful transactions with children.' 6 Ariegwe pled not guilty,
and the district court set his trial for May 13, 2003.17 However,
8
the court subsequently postponed the trial date five times.'
Some of those delays were attributable to the State, and some
were attributable to Ariegwe.' 9
On December 16, 2003, the State amended its information to
add an alternative charge of attempted sexual intercourse without
consent, a felony. 20 Two days later, Ariegwe pled not guilty to the
new charge, and the district court reset his trial for January 5,
2004. However, on December 23, the court vacated that trial date
because the parties awaited forensic test results from the state
21
crime lab.
At a status hearing on January 22, 2004, Ariegwe's lawyer
confirmed he had received the crime lab reports, and the district
court scheduled a trial for March 1, 2004.22 Shortly after the
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 824, 857.
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id. at 825.
Id.
Id.
Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 825.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 852-54.
Id. at 825.
Id.
Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 825.
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hearing, Ariegwe filed a motion to dismiss on grounds his right to
a speedy trial had been violated, and the court denied the mo23
tion.
Ariegwe's case proceeded to trial as scheduled on March 1,
2004.24 The jury found him guilty of attempted sexual intercourse
without consent and unlawful transactions with children. 25 The
district court sentenced Ariegwe "to fifty years in the Montana
State Prison, with fifteen years suspended." 26 Ariegwe timely appealed his convictions on three grounds, one of which was that the
district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a
27
speedy trial.
III.
A.

FEDERAL AND STATE RIGHTS TO SPEEDY TRIAL

The FederalRight to Speedy Trial under the Sixth
Amendment and Barker v. Wingo

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial ... ,"28 This right can be traced
back to the Magna Carta of 1215 and even the Assize of Clarendon, 29 although it remained largely dormant for another four hundred years, until the writings of Sir Edward Coke introduced the
30
right as a significant legal concept in the American colonies.
Even so, it was not until 1905 that the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the right to speedy trial for the first time, in Beavers v.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The jury acquitted Ariegwe of the charge of sexual intercourse without consent.
Id.
26. Id. at 826. The district court suspended 15 years of the prison sentence and also
sentenced Ariegwe to 6 months in a county detention center, to run concurrently with the
prison sentence. Id.
27. Id. at 823. Ariegwe also appealed his conviction on grounds that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial, and that its restitution order
was illegal. Id.
28. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
29. Klopfer v. N.C., 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1966); Natalia Nicolaidis, The Sixth Amendment
Right to a Speedy and Public Trial, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1489, 1489 (1988-1989) (citing
Magna Carta, ch. 40 (1215), reprinted in J. Holt, Magna Cartaand Medieval Government
239-57 (Hambledon Press 1985)).
30. Id. at 1492 (citing Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of
England 43, 55 (Brooke 5th ed. 1797)).
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Haubert.3 1 There, the defendant argued that his right to speedy
trial was violated because he was moved between two New York
City districts, and then ultimately to the District of Columbia, for
his first trial. 32 The Court soundly rejected the defendant's attempt to read more into the right than what was there, explaining
that the right involved time, not place. 3 3 In the words of Justice
McKenna, "[t]he right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is
34
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances."
In 1966, in U.S. v. Ewell, 35 the Court set forth a threefold policy underlying the right to speedy trial, explaining that the right's
objectives were "to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration
prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself."3 6 A year later, in
Klopfer v. North Carolina,37 the Court made the right to speedy
trial applicable to the states by incorporating it into the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, calling it "one of
the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution." 38 Shortly
thereafter, in 1971, the Court decided U.S. v. Marion,39 in which it
held the right to speedy trial begins when a defendant "becomes
an accused" through arrest, indictment, or otherwise. 40 However,
the Court provided no guidance regarding what constituted a violation of a defendant's right to speedy trial until 1972, when the
41
prosecution of a brutal murder case compelled it to do so.
Willie Barker was indicted in September 1958 for murdering
an elderly Kentucky couple with a tire iron. 4 2 In October 1963,
31. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905); Timothy J. Searight, The Sixth Amendment
Right to a Speedy Trial:Applying Barker v. Wingo after United States v. Doggett, 22 W. St.
U.L. Rev. 61, 61 (1994-1995).
32. Beavers, 198 U.S. at 84-85.
33. Id. at 86.
34. Id. at 87.
35. U.S. v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (holding "the passage of 19 months between
the original arrests and the hearings on the later indictments [does not in] itself demonstrate[ ] a violation of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial").
36. Id.
37. Klopfer v. N.C., 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
38. Id. at 222-23, 226.
39. U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
40. Id. at 313, 322 (explaining statutes of limitation, not the Sixth Amendment, protect
against pre-indictment delay).
41. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 516 (1972) (explaining "in none of these cases have
we attempted to set out the criteria by which the speedy trial right is to be judged. This
case compels us to make such an attempt.").
42. Id. at 516.
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after sixteen continuances 4 3 over a five-year period, Barker was
convicted and sentenced to life in prison. 44 Over the next eight
years, he appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Court of Appeals (Kentucky's highest state court until 1976), the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, on grounds that included violation of
his right to speedy trial. 45 Each appellate court affirmed the trial
47
court.46 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In Barker v. Wingo, 48 the Supreme Court held that Barker's
right to speedy trial had not been violated based on its findings
that he was not prejudiced by the delay and indeed did not want a
speedy trial.4 9 However, the Court first went to great lengths to
explain the unique nature of the right to speedy trial, which differs from other constitutional rights of the accused in three important ways.
First, the right to speedy trial protects dual interests that at
times conflict. In addition to the defendant's right to "decent and
fair procedures," society has numerous interests in minimizing delay between a defendant's arrest and trial to prevent various social and economic harms. 50 These societal interests in ensuring a
speedy trial exist "separate from, and at times in opposition to, the
51
interests of the accused."
43. Id. at 517 (explaining "on February 12, 1962, the Commonwealth moved for the
The Commonwealth was granted further continutwelfth time to continue the case ....
ances in June 1962 and September 1962 .... ); id. at 517-18 (referencing two more continuances in February and June 1963, at which point "the court announced that the case would
be dismissed for lack of prosecution if it were not tried during the next term").
44. Id. at 516, 518.
45. Id. at 518.
46. Id.; Barker v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 671, 674-75 (Ky. 1964); Barker v. Wingo,
442 F.2d 1141, 1143-44 (1971 W.D. Ky.). The U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky rejected Barker's petition for habeas corpus without a hearing. Barker, 407
U.S. at 518.
47. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519.
48. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
49. Id. at 534, 536.
50. Id. at 519-21 (citing several reports and studies identifying negative consequences
of pretrial delay, including: (1) manipulation of overcrowded judicial systems by defendants
through the plea-bargaining process; (2) accused individuals committing additional crimes
while awaiting trial; (3) communities fearing that individuals accused of violent crimes are
at large pending their trial; (4) accused individuals jumping bail and escaping punishment;
(5) the detrimental effects of delay on rehabilitation efforts; (6) overcrowding and poor conditions in local jails, which can mentally and physically harm prisoners; (7) high costs of
keeping accused individuals in jail pending trial; (8) the economy's loss of wages that could
have been earned; and (9) costs to society of supporting the "families of incarcerated breadwinners").
51. Id. at 519.
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The second difference indentified by the Court is that deprivation of the right to speedy trial, unlike other constitutional rights
of an accused, "may work to the accused's advantage." 5 2 While
pretrial delay may negatively affect a defendant in some areas of
his life, it often simultaneously jeopardizes the prosecution's ability to meet its burden of proof, as memories fade and witnesses
disappear. 53 Thus, the Court noted, "deprivation of the right to
speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused's ability to de54
fend himself."
The third difference, which the Court said may be the most
important, is that "the right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights." 55 The Court reiterated its
holding from Beavers that "any inquiry into a speedy trial claim
necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular
context of the case."5 6 Because the right is so difficult to define, its
violation warrants the unusually "severe remedy of dismissal of
57
the indictment."
The Court then turned to setting forth a basic framework for
analyzing speedy trial claims. With a touch of foreshadowing, the
Court began by noting, "two rigid approaches are urged upon us as
ways of eliminating some of the uncertainty which courts experience in protecting the right."5 8 The Court "reject[ed] both of the
inflexible approaches-the fixed-time period because it goes further than the Constitution requires; [and] the demand-waiver rule
because it is insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental."5 9
Instead, the Court set forth "a balancing test, in which the
60
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed."
The Court identified "some of the factors" courts should consider
in speedy trial analysis: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3)
defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4)
52. Id. at 521.
53. Id.
54. Barker, 407 U.S. at 521.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 522 (citing Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905)).
57. Id. (contrasting the more serious remedy of dismissal with the less-severe remedies
of an exclusionary rule or reversal for a new trial, but explaining that dismissal "is the only
possible remedy" for violation of the right to speedy trial).
58. Id. at 522-23.
59. Id. at 529-30.
60. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
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prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay. 6 1 As to the
fourth factor, prejudice, the Court explained that it
should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which
the speedy trial right was designed to protect ....

(i) to prevent

oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense
will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the
to prepare his case skews the
inability of a defendant adequately
62
fairness of the entire system.
However, the Court noted that no one factor is "necessary or sufficient" to dispose of a speedy trial claim. 6 3 Instead, "they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." 64 In addition, each factor's
65
weight depends upon the circumstances of the case.
The Court concluded that, although five years was too long a
delay, 66 Barker did not show he was prejudiced by the delay 6 7 or
that he even truly opposed the delay-in fact, the record showed
he may have wanted it.68 Therefore, Willie Barker's right to a
speedy trial was not violated. 69 For another two decades, the
Court would be largely silent on the right to speedy trial, except to
provide straightforward clarification regarding which delays
courts can consider as part of a speedy trial claim. 70 Perhaps it
helped that two years after Barker, Congress passed the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974, setting statutory time limits for accomplishing
71
each stage of federal prosecution.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Id. at 530-31.

66. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533-34.
67. Id. at 534 (stating that "prejudice was minimal" because although "Barker was
prejudiced to some extent by living for over four years under a cloud of suspicion and anxiety" and "did spend 10 months in jail before trial," he did not suffer from loss of witnesses
or memories at trial).
68. Id. at 534-35 ("More important than the absence of serious prejudice, is the fact
that Barker did not want a speedy trial.").
69. Id. at 536.
70. See U.S. v. MacDonald,456 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1982) (affirming holding of U.S. v. Marion
that analysis of speedy trial guarantee does not include periods of time prior to arrest and
additionally holding it also excludes periods of time after charges are dismissed); U.S. v.
Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 310-12,316-17 (1986) (affirming time constraints of MacDonald
and additionally holding defendant's speedy trial claim may not include delays attributable
to State's meritorious or defendant's frivolous interlocutory appeals).
71. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (2006) (generally requiring prosecution to bring a defendant to trial within 70 days of indictment, which must be filed within
30 days of arrest or service of summons). The Speedy Trial Act does not apply to juvenile
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In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court returned to the right to
speedy trial in Doggett v. U.S.72 Eight years after the federal
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) indicted Marc Doggett for conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine, 73 federal authorities located and arrested him.7 4 After a federal magistrate and district
court denied Doggett's motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial,
Doggett entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 75 All Doggett's lower court appeals failed because the courts, applying the four factors set forth
in Barker, found that Doggett failed to make any affirmative
showing under the fourth factor that the delay prejudiced him or
76
his ability to defend against the conspiracy charges.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed,
holding "excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify." 77 It cited to Barker for the proposition that "impairment of one's defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial
prejudice to prove because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence
and testimony 'can rarely be shown.' "78 Thus, the Court held the
Government's eight-and-a-half-year delay in prosecuting Doggett,
even though "unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice,"
was sufficient to entitle Doggett to relief under his right to speedy
79
trial claim.
After Doggett, the Court once again ceased to provide further
substantial guidance in interpreting the Sixth Amendment right
to speedy trial. As a result, states have been left to grapple with
Barker and its four factors, which can appear skeletal in comparison to the heft of the right at stake. All fifty state constitutions
provide a right to speedy trial independent of the Sixth Amendment.8 0 However, in interpreting that right, state courts may not
tread upon the basic guarantees of the U.S. Constitution by im81
posing a narrower state right.
delinquency proceedings, which are instead subject to the Juvenile Delinquency Act. 18
U.S.C. §§ 5031, 5036 (2006).
72. Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
73. Id. at 648, 650.
74. Id. at 650.
75. Id. at 650-51.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 651, 655.
78. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972)).
79. Id. at 658-59.
80. Klopfer v. N.C., 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967).
81. See id. at 222.
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Montana's Right to Speedy Trial under the Montana
Constitution and City of Billings v. Bruce

The Montana Constitution provides a right to "a speedy public trial" that is independent from that provided in the Sixth
Amendment. 2 However, the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention Bill of Rights Committee understood the provision to be
"basically the same" as the Sixth Amendment8 3 and voted unanimously to adopt the same sparse wording found in the 1899 Montana Constitution, explaining "it was an admirable statement of
the fundamental procedural rights of an accused."8 4 In analyzing
whether this right was violated, the Montana Supreme Court used
"essentially the same factors" articulated in Barker, until it de85
cided City of Billings v. Bruce in

1998.86

In Bruce, the Montana Supreme Court worried that the fourfactor balancing test of Barker was producing "seemingly inconsistent results" nationwide.8 7 The Court ultimately retained the four
Barker factors but clarified them by "incorporat[ing] objective,
bright-line criteria into three of them, and . . . modiflying] the
function and importance each factor plays in the overall balancing."8 8 The four factors and their interaction within the Bruce test
are summarized here only briefly, in order to provide a backdrop
for the recent developments this note will discuss in part IV.
Under the first factor-length of delay-the Bruce Court established that 200 days of delay would trigger speedy trial analysis, regardless of fault for the delay.8 9 The overall length of delay
would then be considered again later, in allocating the burden of
proving prejudice or lack thereof. 90 However, Factor One itself
82. Mont. Const. art. II, § 24.
83. Montana Constitutional Convention 1971-1972 vol. V, 1776 (Margaret S. Warden
et al. eds., Mont. Legis. 1979-1982) (verbatim transcript).
84. Id. at vol. II, 640-41 (committee comments) and vol. V, 1776 (verbatim transcript).
85. City ofBillings v. Bruce, 965 P.2d 866 (Mont. 1998).
86. State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 827 (Mont. 2007) (quoting State v. Sanders, 516 P.2d
372, 375 (Mont. 1973); citing Fitzpatrick v. Crist, 528 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Mont. 1974); State v.
Steward, 543 P.2d 178, 181 (Mont. 1975) (explaining the Court adopted an early version of
the Barker factors in 1968 based on U.S. v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1964))).
87. Bruce, 965 P.2d at 871 (citing Brian P. Brooks, A New Speedy Trial Standard for
Barker v. Wingo: Reviving a ConstitutionalRemedy in an Age of Statutes, 61 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 587, 587 (1994)).
88. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 827.
89. Bruce, 965 P.2d at 877.
90. Id.
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constituted a "threshold criterion" that, once met, was not considered again in the analysis. 9 1
Under the second factor-reasons for delay-the Bruce Court
held courts must assign responsibility for each period of delay, including a specific number of days, to one of the parties. 9 2 If less
than 275 days of delay were attributable to the State, the defendant had the burden of demonstrating that the delay prejudiced
him. 93 If 275 or more days of delay were attributable to the State,
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arose, and the State had the
burden to overcome it by showing the defendant was not
prejudiced.9 4 If the State met its burden, the burden shifted to the
defendant to show that he was prejudiced by the delay. It was
then up to the district court to weigh each party's evidence. 9 5
Under the third factor-timely assertion of right-the Bruce
Court held the defendant merely needed to invoke his right to
speedy trial at any time prior to the trial. The defendant could do
so "either by demanding a speedy trial or by moving to dismiss for
failure to provide a speedy trial."9 6 Thus, this factor was merely a
simple "yes or no" consideration.
Finally, under the fourth factor-prejudice to the defendantthe Bruce Court held it would continue to consider whether the
delay prejudiced the defendant through "(1) pretrial incarceration,
(2) anxiety and concern, [or] (3) impairment of defense." 9 7 The
Court noted that "the importance of this factor and the degree of
prejudice to establish denial of speedy trial will vary based upon
other considerations, such as the length of delay and the reason
for delay."9 8
In name, the four Bruce factors remain largely recognizable in
the new right to speedy trial analysis under Ariegwe. However,
the Ariegwe Court realized that, while the existing Bruce framework contained most of the necessary pieces, the analysis failed to
truly reflect the balancing act envisioned by the United States Supreme Court. It further decided that the analysis needed a heavy
dose of clarification in order for practitioners and courts to apply it
consistently.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 828.
Bruce, 965 P.2d at 877.
Id. at 877-78.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 878-79.
Bruce, 965 P.2d at 878.
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STATE V. ARIEGWE PART ONE: RESTORING THE
BALANCING TEST

A.

The Montana Supreme Court's Reassessment of Bruce

9
After reviewing the federal Barker test 9 and Montana's
10 0 the Court announced it would "take this opportunity
Bruce test,
to revisit the process by which speedy trial claims are to be analyzed by the courts of this State and to revise [its] analytical
framework in several significant respects." 10 1 The Court began by
noting that, although it previously characterized its speedy trial
analysis as a balancing test, it was closer to a "four-step analytical
progression" that "channel[ed] the focus of the analysis to the issue of prejudice" while making the first three factors less significant.1 0 2 Thus, the Court decided it had strayed from the balancing test envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court and stated it now
believes "an actual balancing of all four factors is preferred and, in
fact, is more likely to produce an accurate assessment of a speedy
factors
trial claim than is an approach under which three of 0the
3
fourth."
the
to
preludes
mere
as
function, essentially,
The Court also rejected Ariegwe's argument that if the State
caused at least 275 days of delay and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, Ariegwe had no burden to present any proof of
prejudice.' 0 4 The Court decided that this reasoning, while consistent with its previous holdings, was no longer appropriate:
"presuming prejudice based on nothing more than the State's failure to prove the contrary is not, in our view, an accurate basis on
which to evaluate a speedy trial claim." 0 5 Finally, the Court rejected its previous holding in Bruce that further analysis of Factor
if the defendant
Three (timely assertion of right) was unnecessary
10 6
trial.
speedy
to
right
his
asserted
had timely
The Court then unveiled its "revised speedy trial test," along
with "several important rules" for its application. 0 7 More accurately, it painstakingly elucidated a detailed speedy trial analysis
99. State v.Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 826-27 (Mont. 2007) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972)); see supra nn. 45-73.
100. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 827-28 (citing Bruce, 965 P.2d 866); see supra nn. 92-104.
101. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 829.
102. Id. at 828.
103. Id. at 829.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 826.
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over the course of almost twenty pages.1 0 8 A summary of the test
spanned another three pages, followed by a two-page outline provided "[fior the convenience of the bench and bar." 10 9 Although
the Court's opinion was unanimous, four justices specially con11 0
curred to "bemoan the law's complexity."
B.

The Revised Speedy Trial Test under Ariegwe

The Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed that Barker's fourfactor balancing approach is "the correct and most complete standard available to judge speedy trial questions.""' However, it
noted that its revised test is grounded in Article II, section 24 of
the Montana Constitution, independent of the U.S. Constitution.112 Thus the Court announced it would "give [its] own mean1 3
ing" to the Barker factors, as follows.
1.

New Factor One: Length of Delay

The Court clarified that establishing a presumptively prejudicial delay must be a two-part inquiry. Trial courts must twice address the length of the delay: "first, as a threshold matter and
then, if the speedy trial test has been triggered, as a factor to be
weighed in the overall balancing. "114
As to length of delay as a threshold, the Court reaffirmed the
200-day threshold for triggering speedy trial analysis." 5 It added
that "the speedy trial clock begins to run at the earliest of' formal
accusation (by arrest, complaint, indictment or information) and
1 16
ends at the date of trial or entry of a guilty plea.
As to consideration of the length of delay as a factor in the
overall balancing, the Montana Supreme Court adopted the U.S.
Supreme Court's rule that once the threshold is met and the presumption of prejudice arises, "the court must then consider, as one
factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches be108. Id. at 829-47.
109. Id. at 847-50.
110. Id. at 864 (Rice, Morris, Leaphart & Warner, JJ., specially concurring).
111. Id. (quoting State v. Tiedemann, 584 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Mont. 1978)) (internal quotations omitted).
112. Id. at 829.
113. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 830.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 831.
116. Id.
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yond the [trigger date]. ' "117 The Court rejected its previous 275day bright-line rule from Bruce for determining who bears the
burden of showing prejudice or lack thereof, explaining that
"Barker's reference to 'presumptively prejudicial' delay was not
meant to place the burden of proof ...entirely on the State or to
mandate a finding of prejudice absent evidence to the contrary."1 1 8
Instead, the Court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's "intensifying presumption of prejudice." 119 Under this measure, the
longer the delay suffered by a defendant, the lower the quantum
of proof the defendant need show and the higher the quantum of
proof the State must show under Factor Four (prejudice to defendant). 120 Thus, the presumption of prejudice will not necessarily
relieve a defendant of showing evidence of prejudice, but rather
indicates the "quantum of evidence" required of each party. 12 1 In
addition, prejudice need not be presumed merely because the
State fails to present sufficient evidence to the contrary, because
to do so could provide a defendant with "an undeserved windfall."1 22 Finally, the Court noted that the length of the delay also
bears on Factor Two: the longer the delay, the greater the State's
burden to show "valid justifications," and the "more compelling
12 3
the State's justifications for the delay must be."
2.

New Factor Two: Reasons for Delay

The Court reiterated that, under the second factor of its revised speedy trial analysis, a district court must 1) identify each
period of delay; 2) determine who was responsible for it; and 3)
assign weight to it based on the cause and motive.1 2 4 With regard
to determining how heavily a delay should be weighted against a
party, the Court provided examples from Barker indicating a spectrum of responsibility:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since
117.
ted).
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. (quoting Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992)) (internal quotations omitId. at 833.
Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 831-33 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652).
Id. at 833.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 835-36.
Id. at 836-37.
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the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with
the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid
reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropri125
ate delay.

The Court held that the function of this factor "is no longer 'to
conclusively establish a burden shift for the determination of
prejudice,' " but to determine "the specific cause and culpability
for each period of delay. ' 12 6 The Court explained:
Obviously, the more delay in bringing the accused to trial that is
due to lack of diligence or other "unacceptable" reasons, the more
likely the accused's speedy trial right has been violated. Likewise,
the more delay caused by the accused for "unacceptable" reasons,
1 27
the less likely the right has been violated.

The final consideration under this factor recognizes that
courts and prosecutors bear "the primary burden" of bringing
cases to trial. 12 s Thus, as the Court noted in its analysis of the
first factor, 12 9 the longer a delay lasts "beyond the 200-day trigger
date, the more compelling the State's justifications for the delay
" 130
must be.
3. New FactorThree: "Mere Assertion of Right" Becomes
"Defendant'sResponses to the Delay"
The Court retained its holding that there is no "magical time"
for a defendant to assert his right to speedy trial. 13 1 However, the
Court went on to hold that it will no longer end its analysis there,
because "the overall accuracy of the balancing test is enhanced
when the totality of the accused's responses to pretrial delays is
considered.' 3 2 Thus, a "court must evaluate the accused's responses to the delay-i.e., his or her acquiescence in and objections to pretrial delays."1 33 These responses must be evaluated
based on surrounding circumstances, including "the timeliness,
persistence, and sincerity of the objections, the reasons for the acquiescence, whether the accused was represented by counsel, the
125.
phasis
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 837 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972) (emadded, footnote omitted)).
Id. at 839 (overruling and quoting State v. Haser, 20 P.3d 100, 105 (Mont. 2001)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 529) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 835-36; supra n. 48 and accompanying text.
Id. at 836, 839.
Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 839.
Id.
Id. at 840.
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accused's pretrial conduct . .. and so forth."13 4 In addition, the
district court may not infer that a defendant did not want a
speedy trial or waived his right to one solely because the defen135
dant did not object to pretrial delay.
4.

New FactorFour: Prejudice to Defendant

The Ariegwe Court reaffirmed that the right to speedy trial is
intended to protect the three fundamental interests set forth in
Barker.13 6 The Court noted that "[t]he first interest-preventing
oppressive pretrial incarceration-reflects the 'core concern' of the
speedy trial guarantee: 'impairment of liberty.' "137 The Court
held that this inquiry requires courts to consider all circumstances
surrounding the defendant's incarceration, especially its duration.'13 For example, when examining the duration of the incarceration, the court must consider whether and how the duration
was affected by the complexity of the charges or the defendant's
own misconduct, such as a propensity to flee. 13 9 The Court also
held that "the conditions of the incarceration are relevant in as140
sessing oppressiveness."'
The Court explained that the focus of the second interest,
minimizing the defendant's anxiety and concern, is "on the ways
in which the presence of unresolved criminal charges has disrupted the accused's life.' 14 1 However, the Court was careful to
distinguish that some anxiety and disruption are inherent in facing criminal charges; thus, the question is whether the anxiety
and disruption were due to delay and not the charges them42
selves. 1
Finally, the Court emphasized that the third interest, impairment to the accused's defense, is the most serious because it
"skews the fairness of the entire system."'143 However, the Court
noted that, while this concern may carry more weight than the
134. Id. at 841.
135. Id. at 841-42.
136. Id. at 842 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972); Doggett v. U.S., 505
U.S. 647, 654 (1992)).
137. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 843 (quoting U.S. v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 844.
141. Id. at 845.
142. Id.
143. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 845 (quoting Barker v.Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972)) (internal quotations omitted).
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first two, it "is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to
prove because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony can rarely be shown. " 144 Therefore, the defendant need not
show "affirmative proof of particularized prejudice." 14 5 However,
absent such affirmative proof, the Court explained that courts
must assess impairment based upon other factors such as the
length of delay, the defendant's responses, and the duration of
1 46
pretrial incarceration.
5.

Balancing the Four Factors

Having clarified each factor, the Ariegwe Court reaffirmed its
position that, as the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Barker, the
four factors stated above must be balanced, and none is dispositive.147 They must all be considered together with any other relevant circumstances.1 48 No one factor has the most significant
weight, and a factor's relative "significance will vary from case to
case." 149
6.

Summary and Outline

After setting forth the revised right to speedy trial test, the
Court reiterated that its purpose was to "revis[e] our framework
for analyzing speedy trial claims so that it more closely tracks the
balancing approach envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Barker,Doggett, and other post-Barker cases. '1 50 It then provided
a three-page summary of the four factors and the balancing test it
had just set forth.1 5 1 Following its summary, the Court also provided, "for the convenience of the bench and bar," a two-page out152
line of its revised test.
C.

Timing of Speedy Trial Motion and Ruling by Court

Finally, the Court succinctly addressed two procedural matters relating to application of the speedy trial analysis. First, it
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 846 (quoting Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992)).
Id. (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655) (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 846-47.
Id. at 847.
Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 847.
Id.
Id. at 847-49.
Id. at 849-50.
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revised its previous rule from Bruce that required speedy trial motions to be filed at least ten days before trial, or any resulting delay would be assigned to the defendant. 15 3 It modified the rule to
require that
any delay directly attributable to the filing of a speedy trial motion
less than thirty days prior to the scheduled trial date should be
charged to the accused. Conversely, any delay directly attributable
to the filing of such a motion thirty or more days prior to the scheduled trial
date should be charged to the State (as institutional de15 4
lay).

Second, the Court reaffirmed its previous requirement that
"once a motion to dismiss for denial of speedy trial has been made,
...it [must] be ruled upon by the district court before commencement of trial." 5 5 However, it added that "the court must.., enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each of the
four factors and how the four factors were balanced against each
15 6
other."
STATE V. ARIEGWE PART

V.

Two:

THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF

ITS NEW BALANCING TEST TO ARIEGWE'S SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIM

Once the Court set forth its revised speedy analysis test, it
could have vacated the district court's judgment and remanded
Ariegwe's claim for reconsideration using the new parameters. Instead, the Court proceeded to use the factual record before it to
apply the revised speedy trial test to Ariegwe's claims, explaining
it would be helpful to illustrate the analysis for courts and liti5 7
gants.
A.
1.

Applying the Four Factors

Application of Factor One: Length of Delay

In considering the first factor, the Court found the trial delay
in Ariegwe's case was 408 days (over twice the amount required to
trigger speedy trial analysis). 158 Therefore, the State was required to provide "particularly compelling justification for the de153.
154.
155.
ted).
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 850-51 (citing City of Billings v. Bruce, 965 P.2d 866, 878 (Mont. 1998)).
Id. at 851.
Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 851 (quoting Bruce, 965 P.2d at 878) (internal quotations omitId.
Id. at 851-52.
Id. at 852.
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lay under Factor Two" and "make a highly persuasive showing
that Ariegwe was not prejudiced by the delay" under Factor
Four.159 At the same time, "the quantum of proof' the Court
would expect of Ariegwe under Factor Four would be "correspond1 60
ingly lower.
2. Application of Factor Two: Reasons for Delay
Under Factor Two, the Court identified and reviewed each period of delay and the circumstances of and reason for each delay.
It concluded that of the 408 days of delay, 241 days were attributable to the State as institutional delay, 42 days to the State due
to lack of diligence, and 105 days to the State due to understaffing
and lack of diligence, for a total of 388 days of delay attributable to
the State. 16 The remaining 20 days were charged to Ariegwe. 16 2
The Court noted that "95% of the delay in this case is attributable
to the State" and concluded that Factor Two weighed in favor of
Ariegwe. 1 63
3. Application of Factor Three: Defendant's Responses to the
Delay
The Court proceeded with a full analysis of Ariegwe's claim
under the new Factor Three analysis, focusing on Ariegwe's responses to the delays. 16 4 However, it stated it would give little
weight to this factor in Ariegwe's case because Ariegwe had proceeded under the previous rule from Bruce, which required only
that a defendant assert his right to speedy trial at some time
before trial.' 65 The Court noted that Ariegwe filed a motion to dismiss thirty-five days before trial but found that "as a general rule
the mere fact that the accused filed a motion to dismiss on speedy
trial grounds sometime prior to the commencement of trial is itself
of little probative value on the question of whether the right has
been violated." 66 The Court also noted that, while Ariegwe
waited until long past the 200-day trigger date to assert his right,
he had also requested several discoverable items from the State
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 852-54.
Id. at 854.
Id.
Id. at 854-55.
Id. at 855.
Id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

19

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 5

482

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 69

that had not been provided. 16 7 This suggested that, overall,
Ariegwe had wanted to move the case along. 168 Thus, the Court
concluded that, although it would give Factor Three "little weight
in the overall balancing," the factor weighed slightly in Ariegwe's
69
favor. 1
4. Application of Factor Four: Prejudice to Defendant
Finally, under Factor Four the Court considered whether the
delay in bringing Ariegwe to trial caused prejudice to him. The
Court explained:
[Wihile both parties should come forward with evidence on the
question of prejudice, the court must weigh each party's evidence (or
lack thereof) in light of [the] intensifying presumption. Specifically,
as the delay gets longer, the necessary showing by the accused of
showing by
particularized prejudice decreases while the necessary
170
the State of no prejudice simultaneously increases.
The Court had already determined under Factor One that the
State had to "make a highly persuasive showing . . . while the
quantum of proof... expected of Ariegwe under this factor is correspondingly lower.' 171 The Court considered each of the interests
the speedy trial right was intended to preserve: "preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern
caused by the presence of unresolved criminal charges, and limiting the possibility that the accused's ability to present an effective
72
defense will be impaired."'
Ariegwe conceded that his four-day incarceration prior to trial
was not oppressive and failed to show how his ability to present an
effective defense was impaired in any specific way (although he
argued some impairment "must be presumed given the length of
the delay"). 1 73 Thus, Ariegwe focused on showing specific instances of anxiety and concern caused to him by the delay.' 7 4 The
State argued that any suffering experienced by Ariegwe was
1 75
caused by the charges and his own decisions, not the delay.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 855.
Id. at 855-56.
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 856.
Id. at 856-57.
Id. at 857.
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The Court stated, "the question here is whether the delay in
bringing Ariegwe to trial unduly prolonged the disruption or aggravated the anxiety and concern that are inherent in being accused of a crime."'17 6 The Court agreed with the district court that
it is thus necessary to apportion anxiety and concern between the
charge itself and the delay. 17 7 It also agreed with the district
court that Ariegwe was required to make some showing of particularized or demonstrable prejudice, which he failed to do.' 7 8 Finally, the Court refused to consider evidence of anxiety and concern suffered by Ariegwe's family except to the extent it affected
1 79
Ariegwe.
The Court concluded the State "made the required highly persuasive showing that Ariegwe was not prejudiced by the delay.' 8 0
There was no oppressive pretrial incarceration; the State showed
"Ariegwe's ability to present an effective defense had not been demonstrably impaired"; and" 'the primary source' of Ariegwe's anxiety and concern was the nature of the charged offenses."'' 1 Thus,
this factor weighed in favor of the State.
B.

The Balancing Test

Turning to the balancing portion of its analysis of Ariegwe's
speedy trial claim, the Court explained that "[a] court assessing a
speedy trial claim must balance the four factors based on the facts
82
of the particular case and the weights assigned to each factor."'
The Court found that Factors One, Two, and Three weighed in
83
Ariegwe's favor, while Factor Four weighed in the State's favor.1
However, as the Court had warned earlier, it gave little weight to
Ariegwe's responses to the delay under Factor Three and concluded that the "State's highly persuasive showing of no prejudice
(Factor Four)" outweighed the other factors that were in Ariegwe's
favor.' 8 4 Therefore, it held, the trial delay did not violate
Ariegwe's constitutional right to a speedy trial.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 857-58.
Id. at 858.
Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 857.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 858-59.
Id. at 859.
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ANALYSIS

Ariegwe's revised speedy trial analysis primarily presents
problems at three levels. First, several general criticisms are warranted, in light of how the test has historically been applied and
was meant to be applied. Second, a careful examination of each of
the revised factors and their application reveals significant discrepancies between federal jurisprudence and the Montana Supreme Court's opinion. Finally, it is possible that Ariegwe restricts the right to speedy trial beyond that contemplated by the
Sixth Amendment, which would render it unconstitutional. The
analysis concludes with a brief discussion of the Montana Supreme Court's treatment of speedy trial claims post-Ariegwe and
guidance for practitioners applying Ariegwe's analysis.
While the Montana Supreme Court stated it was grounding
its speedy trial analysis in the Montana Constitution's right to
speedy trial,1 85 it nonetheless proceeded to overhaul the analysis
with an eye toward the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment under Barker, emphasizing that "Barker'sbalancing approach is 'the correct and most complete standard available to judge speedy trial questions.' 1816 Moreover, the Montana
Supreme Court previously "incorporated the Supreme Court's
clarification of the four factors into [the] existing analytical framework."1 8 7 Given that the Montana Supreme Court originally
adopted Barker's four factors into Montana case law, and because
the Ariegwe Court apparently hoped to better conform Montana
law to the spirit of Barker and the balancing test found there, it is
appropriate to consider whether the Court succeeded in that goal.
As a starting point, a visual comparison of the two tests illustrates the formidable gulf between Barker's simple four-factor
analysis and the Ariegwe Court's newly defined speedy trial analysis. Under Barker, courts are to use a balancing test that considers all relevant factors, including but not limited to:
I.
II.
III.
IV.

Length of delay;
Reason for the delay;
The defendant's assertion of his right; and
Prejudice to the defendant, considering the interests the right
is designed to protect:
A. Prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration;
B. Minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and

185. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 829-30.
186. Id. at 829 (quoting State v. Tiedemann, 584 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Mont. 1978)).
187. Id. at 827 (citations omitted).
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Limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. 18 8

Under Ariegwe, courts are to similarly use a balancing test
that considers all relevant factors, as follows:
I.

Factor One: The Length of the Delay
A. Is the delay long enough to trigger the four-factor balancing
test?
1. When did the defendant become an accused?
2. When is the defendant's trial date?
3. Is the interval between accusation and trial at least 200
days?
B. To what extent does the delay stretch beyond the trigger
date?
1. The presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the
accused intensifies over time; thus, as the delay gets
longer, the quantum of proof that may be expected of
the accused under Factor Four decreases, while the
quantum of proof that may be expected of the State
under Factor Four simultaneously increases.
2. The State's burden under Factor Two to justify the delay likewise increases with the length of the delay; thus,
the further the delay stretches beyond the 200-day trigger date, the more compelling the State's justifications
under Factor Two must be.
II. Factor Two: The Reasons for the Delay
A. Identify each period of delay in bringing the accused to
trial.
B. Attribute each period of delay to the appropriate party;
1. The prosecution bears the burden of explaining the
pretrial delays.
2. Any delay not demonstrated to have been caused by
the accused or affirmatively waived by the accused is
attributed to the State by default.
C. Assign weight to each period of delay based on the specific
cause and culpability for the delay.
1. Bad-faith delay, such as a deliberate attempt to gain a
tactical advantage or to avoid trial, weighs heavily
against the party that caused it.
2. Negligence or lack of diligence in bringing the accused
to trial occupies the middle ground on the culpability
scale. It is weighed more lightly against the State than
a deliberate attempt to hamper the defense, but it still
falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable
and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun.
3. Delay inherent in the criminal justice system and
caused by circumstances largely beyond the control of
the prosecutor and the accused is "institutional delay,"
188. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972).
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which is attributed to the State but weighs less heavily
against the State than bad-faith delay and lack of diligence.
4. Delay for "valid" reasons, such as a missing witness or
a particularly complex charged offense, is weighed
least heavily of all the types of delay.
III. Factor Three: The Accused's Responses to the Delay
A. Evaluate the accused's responses to the delay-i.e., his or
her acquiescence in and objections to pretrial delays-in
light of the surrounding circumstances. Some considerations:
1. The timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of the objections
2. The reasons for the acquiescence
3. Whether the accused was represented by counsel
4. The accused's pretrial conduct (as that conduct bears
on the speedy trial right)
B. The totality of the accused's various responses to the delays in bringing him or her to trial is indicative of whether
he or she actually wanted a speedy trial, which in turn
informs the inquiry into whether there has been a deprivation of the right.
C. The totality of the accused's various responses to the delays also serves as a gauge of the weights the court should
assign to the other three factors in the balancing.
IV. Factor Four: Prejudice to the Accused
A. Was the pretrial incarceration oppressive, given the circumstances of that incarceration? Some considerations:
1. Duration of the incarceration
2. The complexity of the charged offense(s)
3. Any misconduct on the part of the accused directly related to the pretrial incarceration
4. The conditions of the incarceration
B. Has the delay in bringing the accused to trial unduly prolonged the disruption of his or her life caused by the presence of unresolved criminal charges or aggravated the
anxiety and concern that are inherent in being accused of
a crime? Some considerations:
1. Public scorn or obloquy; damage to reputation in the
community
2. Deprivation of employment
3. Drain of financial resources or economic hardship
4. Curtailment of associations
C. Has the accused's ability to present an effective defense
been impaired by the delay? Some considerations:
1. The availability of witnesses and their ability to recall
accurately events related to the charged offense(s)
2. The accused's ability to raise specific defenses, elicit
specific testimony, or produce specific items of evidence
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The length of the delay (excessive delay presumptively
compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that
neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify)
The accused's responses to the delay (the more imperiled the accused's ability to present an effective defense becomes, the more likely he or she is to complain
about the delay)
The duration of the pretrial incarceration (an accused
who is locked up is hindered in his or her ability to
gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his or her defense)' 8 9

Ariegwe's revised speedy trial analysis is obviously lengthier
and more detailed than that set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court
under Barker. However, given the amorphous and fluid nature of
the right to speedy trial, does it accurately reflect the concerns of
that fundamental right?
A.

Generally Speaking: Why Less Was More

Aside from the substantive changes the Montana Supreme
Court made under the specific factors of its speedy trial analysis,
discussed below in part VI.B, several problems arise simply from
the Court's creation of the new test. First, the reasoning behind
the creation of the new speedy trial test is itself suspect. The
Ariegwe Court contended that "the four-factor balancing test had,
unfortunately, led to 'seemingly inconsistent results' nationwide." 190 If Barker's application rendered different results for
similarly-situated defendants, the Court would have been justified
in creating a sweeping change in the framework for speedy trial
rights under the Sixth Amendment and Article II, section 24 of the
Montana Constitution.
However, the claim that Barker's test led to "inconsistent results" is not supported by any authority. 191 This statement, which
predicated and justified the Court's reconstruction of the speedy
trial test under Barker, Doggett, the Sixth Amendment, and Article II, section 24 of the Montana Constitution, is an incorrect interpretation of the single law review article cited and numerous
Montana cases. Rather, "courts have not applied a consistent legal
standard in speedy trial cases."' 9 2 The problem, if one existed,
189. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 849-50.
190. Id. at 827 (quoting City of Billings v. Bruce, 965 P.2d 866, 871, 871-76 (Mont. 1998)
("identifying varied and inconsistent applications of the test in [Montana's] own caselaw")).
191. Id. (emphasis added).
192. Brooks, supra n. 87, at 587 (emphasis added).
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was not in Barker's results, but rather in federal trial courts' different constructions of the Barker framework. The Montana
speedy trial jurisprudence cited in Bruce supports such a proposition.193 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned courts applying Barker's factors that it was merely "identify[ing] some of
the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a
particular defendant has been deprived of his right."1 9 4 The Court
suggested that the factors would be constructed or interpreted differently and yet withstand constitutional scrutiny. Therefore, the
"problem" identified in Bruce and Ariegwe was not constitutional
in nature, and the "inconsistent results" argument offered by the
Montana Supreme Court to justify overhauling Bruce actually
provided little or no justification.
Perhaps even more problematic for Montana courts and practitioners, the compartmentalized "checklist" of questions to answer in conducting a speedy trial analysis skews the fluidity of the
Barker test from the outset. The speedy trial inquiry is necessarily fluid because courts must balance a number of factors, no one
of which is dispositive. 195 Barker and Doggett provided a very
simple weighing and balancing framework: has the speedy trial
inquiry been triggered (prejudice is presumed to intensify as the
delay exceeds the triggering date); why has the delay occurred, or
who is to blame for the delay; has the defendant objected to the
96
delay; and has the defendant been prejudiced as a result?
At first glance, the Ariegwe test appears similar to the federal
speedy trial right framework, at least with regard to Barker's four
factors. However, upon closer examination, Ariegwe has expanded
Barker's four factors into an unworkable, redundant, and timeconsuming examination of a defendant's speedy trial right. In
considering the speedy trial right, the Montana Supreme Court
failed to heed the warning of the old adage: history repeats itself.
The Court, in explaining why it felt compelled to rework the
speedy trial analysis from Bruce, stated:
Although [the Bruce] modifications to our speedy trial test resulted
in a more structured analytical approach, we recognize, for the reasons which follow, that our method of analysis has strayed considerably from the actual balancing approach envisioned in Barker
197

193. Bruce, 965 P.2d at 871-76.
194. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 533.

196. Id. at 530-33; Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992).
197. State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 828 (Mont. 2007).
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After acknowledging that Bruce "strayed considerably" from
Barker, the Montana Supreme Court expounded the Barker factors to include myriad analytical requirements not envisioned in
the federal speedy trial right framework. The Court ended up creating an even more structured analytical approach that threatens
to devour the balancing test envisioned by Barker.
A rigid framework for analyzing speedy trial rights is counterintuitive to the U.S. Supreme Court's description of the speedy
trial right as "amorphous" and "slippery."'198 The Montana Supreme Court took twenty-one pages to set forth a right-to-speedytrial analysis that took the United States Supreme Court a few
paragraphs. 19 9 In doing so, the Montana Supreme Court has indeed created the "mother of all balancing tests ' 20 0 as well as fulfilled the omen articulated in Doggett that over-examination of
Barker's factors would obscure the purpose and intent of the
20
speedy trial right.
B.

A Closer Look at "the Mother of All Balancing Tests"

In Ariegwe, the Montana Supreme Court expressed that it
was attempting a second time to bring Montana's right to speedy
trial analysis into line with what the U.S. Supreme Court envisioned in Barker. Indeed, the Ariegwe Court altered numerous aspects of Montana's former speedy trial analysis under Bruce,
which had likewise been an inaccurate interpretation of Barker.
However, a factor-by-factor comparison of Barker's test and
Ariegwe's revised test indicates that the Court still has not
achieved Barker's vision or its aims.
1.

The Length of Delay and the "Quantum of Proof'

The Montana Supreme Court unnecessarily obfuscated
Barker's first factor-the length of delay-by requiring an evidentiary "quantum of proof' analysis and a determination of the extent of delay beyond the trigger date "irrespective of fault for the
delay."20 2 In addition, the Court set a "presumptively prejudicial"
198. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522; see also Brooks, supra n. 87, at 587 (describing the right to
speedy trial as "amorphous, slippery, and generally difficult to vindicate") (citations omitted).
199. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 829-50; Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-32.
200. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 864 (Rice, Morris, Leaphart & Warner, JJ., specially concurring).
201. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 669 (Thomas, Scalia, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
202. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 833, 836 (emphasis added).
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triggering date for speedy trial analysis which, although not incorrect under Barker, demands an earlier speedy trial analysis than
the majority of other jurisdictions. 20 3 Together, these requirements will lead to confusion and increased demands on the time
and resources of courts already overburdened by crowded dockets.

20 4

The Ariegwe Court reaffirmed its 200-day threshold as the
minimum length of delay necessary before a defendant can claim a
violation of his right to a speedy trial. 20 5 Interestingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted in Doggett that "lower courts have generally
found post-accusation delay 'presumptively prejudicial' at least as
it approaches one year."20 6 Additionally, commentators have observed that, "[w]hile some courts still follow the eight-month mark
or even something shorter, most have settled on a somewhat
longer period, such as nine months or, more commonly, a time 'approaching,' at, or slightly (or even more than slightly) beyond one
year."20 7 Comparatively, two hundred days-or roughly six and a
half months-represents a dramatically shorter timeframe in
which the State must prosecute a criminal defendant or answer to
a constitutional speedy trial challenge. Montana, like many
states, already struggles to meet the demands on its resources,
including increasing demands on judicial funding and rethe
sources. 20 8 Ariegwe has added to that burden by triggering
20 9
speedy trial analysis after only 200 days have elapsed.
203. Id. at 830-31.
204. Karla M. Gray, 2007 State of the JudiciaryAddress, 60th Leg., Jt. Sess., 5-6, 8
(Jan. 18, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.montanacourts.orglstate-judiciary/
2007.pdf) (describing the state of the judiciary in Montana as "dogged... with large inequities in employee pay," lacking in funding, constrained by time and "heavy caseloads," and
having "substantial need for additional resources." Additionally, Chief Justice Gray implored the legislature to "be mindful ... that imposing stricter, and shorter,and additional,
timelines may result in expectations and requirements of District Courts that simply cannot humanly be met." (emphasis added)).
205. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 831.
206. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n. 1 (emphasis added) (citing Wayne R. LaFave & Jarold
H. Israel, Criminal Procedure vol. 2, § 18.2, 405 (3d ed., West 1984); Gregory Joseph,
Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 611, 623 n. 71 (1980)).
207. Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure vol. 5, § 18.2(b), 119 (3d ed., West 2007) (citations omitted).
208. Gray, supra n. 204.
209. Some states have prescribed shorter speedy trial rules that are statutory rather
than constitutional. For example, Washington Superior Court Criminal Procedure Rule
3.3 requires the defendant be brought to trial within 60 days if incarcerated and 90 days if
not incarcerated. Wash. R. Crim. P. 3.3(b). However, the rule "is not a constitutional mandate." State v. Campbell, 691 P.2d 929, 938 (Wash. 1984) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
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More importantly, neither Barker nor its progeny compelled
an evidentiary burden or "quantum of proof' analysis under the
length of delay factor. Such an analysis misapprehends a deceptively easy concept articulated in Doggett and unnecessarily confuses the analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court defined the presumption of prejudice to the defendant as "intensify[ing] over time" but
left the analysis to be "discuss[ed] below" 2 10 under the other factors. The Court provided a simple example to illustrate this "intensifying presumption" in favor of the defendant: while the
State's negligence in prosecuting a defendant might be initially
tolerable, eventually courts must presume the delay has
prejudiced the defendant and his defense in ways he cannot
prove. 2 1' Thus, negligence in delay may "intensify" over time from
tolerable to prejudicial. The analysis bears no consideration of the
"quantum" of evidence needed to defeat an "intensifying presumption" but is merely concerned with the length of the delay, who is
responsible, the reasons for the delay, and the prejudice to the defendant.
The intensifying presumption of prejudice likewise cannot be
viewed in isolation, but must be considered with the other factors.
The Ariegwe Court instructed lower courts to "consider the extent
to which the delay ( ...irrespective of fault for the delay) stretches
beyond the 200-day trigger date [because] the presumption that
pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time. '2 12
There is no sound reason to consider the extent of the delay alone,
determine a presumption of prejudice, and then examine the
causes of the delay. Barker and its progeny instructed courts to
determine who is responsible for the delay in conjunction with the
length of the delay and attach a presumption of prejudice accordingly, if warranted. Indeed, the Barker Court analyzed the length
of delay factor as "[cilosely related to . . .the reason the government assigns to justify the delay." 213 These interrelated considerations cannot be separated and examined individually, as Ariegwe
now seems to compel.
514, 523 (1972) (explaining there is "no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy
trial right can be qualified into a specified number of days or months")).
210. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652.
211. Id. at 657 (stating "the weight we assign to official negligence compounds over time
as the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows. Thus, our toleration of such negligence
varies inversely with its protractedness ... and its consequent threat to the fairness of the
accused's trial." (citations omitted)).
212. State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 836 (Mont. 2007) (emphasis added).
213. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
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A simple hypothetical illustrates the awkwardness of this
analysis. A defendant who repeatedly delays his pending trial
and far exceeds the speedy trial triggering date cannot then complain that his speedy trial right has been violated. Thus, there
can be no presumption of prejudice to the defendant. However, a
court applying Ariegwe would nonetheless undergo a lengthy analysis examining how much time has elapsed beyond the 200-day
triggering date, attribute a presumption of prejudice in favor of
the defendant, and speculate as to the "quantum of proof" needed,
all before discerning who was actually responsible for the pretrial
delay. The impracticality of this process demonstrates the benefit
of a fluid balancing test as opposed to a rigid, step-by-step analysis. By misinterpreting the "intensifying presumption" and requiring a "quantum of proof' analysis under the length of delay
factor, to the exclusion of the other factors, the Montana Supreme
Court obscured its speedy trial analysis from the outset.
2.

The Reasons for the Delay and the State's Burden of Proof

Barker and its progeny did not define who has the burden of
proof under a speedy trial constitutional challenge, because the
federal speedy trial right analysis requires both parties to assign
reasons for the delays under Factor Two. The analysis therefore
contemplates an equal burden on both parties for explaining the
pretrial delay.
However, Barker's "reasons for delay" analysis devolved
through state and federal law into a burden on the State to justify
pretrial delay, which is neither compelled nor logical. Barker constitutionally placed the "burden on the courts and the prosecutors
to assure that cases are brought to trial,"2 14 because the "defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that
duty."2 15 Barker required courts to examine "the reason[s] the
government assigns to justify the delay. ' 21 6 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in McNeely v. Blanas,21 7 erroneously interpreted
this language as creating a burden on the State to explain pretrial
21 8
delays, even when the delay is attributable to the defendant.
214. Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 527 (footnotes omitted).
216. Id. at 531.
217. McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2003).
218. Id. at 827; cf H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle,
72 Colum. L. Rev. 1376, 1386-87 (1972) (arguing that, although "[blurden is never discussed by the Court ... it may be safely assumed that it remains where normally lodged:
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Surprisingly, the McNeely court in fact conceded that "Barkerdid
not explicitly identify the burden of proof for pretrial delay. "219
Despite the erroneous creation of a burden on the State to assign reasons for the length of delay in McNeely, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals's interpretation of federal law is not binding on
states. The Montana Supreme Court is free to interpret federal
constitutional law, regardless of federal circuit decisions. 220 The
decision to impose a burden of proof on the State to explain pretrial delays should have been discarded as unnecessary in an already complex, byzantine analysis.
Under the Barker line of speedy trial jurisprudence, both the
State and the defendant should bear the burden of assigning reasons for the delay to assist trial courts, as both the State and the
defendant may share culpability in delaying the trial. Often, the
analysis consists of simply identifying who requested which continuances and for what reasons. Any competent defense attorney
or attentive defendant would independently assign reasons for the
delay to verify the State's reasons and correct any errors or misrepresentations to the court. The burden appears to assist the defendant only when the State is unable to provide a reason for a
particular delay, as the unexplained delay is then weighted
22 1
against the State and for the defendant.
3.

The Accused's Responses to the Delay

The third factor in the speedy trial analysis requires courts to
examine the accused's responses to pretrial delay, given the totality of the circumstances. 2 22 Departing from Bruce's "nonweighted, 'either you asserted the right or you did not' approach,"2 23 the Ariegwe Court more closely aligned the third factor's analysis with the requirements of Barker. However, instead
of staying the course with Barker's simple totality of the circumupon the [defendant, or] moving party"). The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Uviller's analysis of Barker. Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1 (1992).
219. State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 836-37 (Mont. 2007) (quoting McNeely, 336 F.3d at
826-27).
220. See State v. Kills on Top, 793 P.2d 1273, 1304 (Mont. 1990) (holding that the Ninth
Circuit decision in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988), was not binding on
the Montana Supreme Court); see e.g. State v. Dann, 79 P.3d 58, 59 n. 2 (Ariz. 2003) (citing
State v. Sansing, 77 P.3d 30, 33 n. 2 (Ariz. 2003) (explaining "[w]e are not bound by the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of what the Constitution requires") (citations omitted)).
221. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 837.
222. Id. at 840-41.
223. Id. at 839.
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stances analysis, the Montana Supreme Court again charted new
territory by expanding the inquiry to include "some considerations" for district courts to consider.
Barker adopted a weighted inquiry, examining the accused's
response to the delay by asking "[whether and how a defendant
asserts his right," an analysis "closely related to the other factors
...mentioned." 2 24 Unfortunately, Doggett could not clarify this
factor in the analysis because the defendant was unaware of the
indictment against him and therefore could not object to the de22 5
lay.
However, from Barker's simple command, Ariegwe expanded
the accused's response inquiry into a three-part test, requiring
practitioners to (1) evaluate the accused's responses to the delay
by examining several "considerations" and (2) apply a totality of
the circumstances analysis, while (3) using the accused's responses to gauge the weights of the other factors. 2 26 "Some considerations" include "the timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of
the objections, the reasons for the acquiescence, whether the accused was represented by counsel, [and] the accused's pretrial conduct (as that conduct bears on the speedy trial right)." 22 7 Further
complicating the analysis, "[t]he timing and number of instances
in which the accused objects to pretrial delay are not talismanic
[and] a pro forma motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds is itself only marginal evidence of a desire to be brought to trial." 228
The confusion regarding the defendant's assertion of his or
her speedy trial right may stem from the Barker opinion, which
contains seemingly ambiguous language. Indeed, the "considerations" enunciated in the Ariegwe opinion track language of the
U.S. Supreme Court's Barker opinion. 22 9 However, the Montana
Supreme Court misconstrued language from Barker as elements
required for a speedy trial analysis.
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in rejecting the demand-waiver doctrine 230 as too rigid, articulated that
224. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
225. Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 653-54 (1992).
226. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 840-41.
227. Id. at 841, 849-50 (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 841.
229. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 528-31.
230. Id. at 525 (explaining "[tihe demand-waiver doctrine provides that a defendant
waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not
demanded a trial").
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the defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy
trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the
deprivation of the right . . .[because it would . . .allow a court to

to attachweigh the frequency and force of the objections as opposed
23 1
ing significant weight to a purely pro forma objection.

The Court was not attaching a weight to a pro forma objection, but
arguing that a discretionary weighing approach was more appropriate.
The Montana Supreme Court apparently interpreted this
statement against the demand-waiver doctrine as instructing
courts to weigh a pro forma motion as "marginal evidence of a desire to be brought to trial."23 2 However, such a conclusion is antithetical to Barker's holding, which emphasized that "failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he
was denied a speedy trial." 233 In fact, the "defendant's assertion of
his speedy trial right... is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in
determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the
2 34
right."
The analytical chasm between Ariegwe's assertion of the right
analysis and Barker's is too wide to logically bridge. Indeed, the
Montana Supreme Court's interpretation may conflict with its
own purported weighing and balancing approach. Under Barker,
a court may attach any weight it deems appropriate to any objection to delay, including a pro forma motion to dismiss. District
courts should be accorded the flexibility and discretion to assign
whatever weight deemed appropriate to a defendant's responses.
In effect, Montana district courts are now required to be
mind-readers, using extra-sensory judicial perception to determine whether the defendant truly wants to be brought to trial
speedily. How are district courts to determine the defendant's
reasons for acquiescing in the State's delay? How must trial
courts distinguish between an "evidentially marginal pro forma
motion to dismiss" 2 35 and a sincere "objection to delay [that] could
2 36
take the form of a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds?"
Moreover, how do courts determine the "sincerity" of the defen231. Id. at 528-29 (reflecting a concern that counsel for defendants, after being appointed, would file "an automatic, pro forma demand" to ensure their clients did not waive
their right to a speedy trial).
232. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 841.
233. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
234. Id. at 531-32.
235. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 841.
236. Id. at 840.
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dant's objections? These questions must somehow be answered in
the gray area between the defendant's silence and the Montana
23 7
Supreme Court's caution not to "complain early and often."
4.

Prejudice to the Accused

Prejudice to the accused, the final factor under Barker's
framework, has proven the most vexing factor in the speedy trial
analysis. Questions regarding the burden of proof and the quantum of evidence needed to establish prejudice have consistently
dogged the U.S. Supreme Court. 238 The Barker opinion examined
prejudice "in the light of the interests of defendants which the
speedy trial right was designed to protect." 23 9 Specifically, the
Court identified three such interests: "(i) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
2 40
impaired."
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Barker, identified numerous concerns that could arise out of a delayed trial, all to the detriment of
the defendant: the death or disappearance of witnesses; loss of
memory or accurate recall for the defendant or defense witnesses;
loss of a job; disruption of family life; reinforcement of idleness; 2 4 1
hindrance to the defendant's "ability to gather evidence, contact
witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense"; restraint of liberty;
and a forced life "under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often
hostility." 24 2 However, the Court was primarily concerned with
the consequences of delay to the accused's defense and his ability
to meet the government's allegations. Barker's progeny did nothing to change the focus of that concern. Under the prejudice
prong, courts must focus on the damage to the defendant's ability
to present a defense. The more time spent in jail, the more dam3
age to the fabric of the defendant's case. 24
The Ariegwe Court expanded that focus to include concerns
that were neither contemplated nor compelled by the U.S. Su237. Id. at 841.
238. See U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; U.S. v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982); U.S. v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311 (1986); Doggett v. U.S.,
505 U.S. 647, 655-58 (1992).
239. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
240. Id. (citations omitted).
241. Id. (referring to the "little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs" in jail).
242. Id. at 533.
243. Id. at 532.
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preme Court in interpreting the Sixth Amendment. Although the
Court correctly required examination of the three subfactors identified by Barker,2 44 it misinterpreted the analytical focus and
scope of the prejudice analysis.
a.

Oppressive PretrialIncarceration

As described above, inquiry into the oppressiveness of pretrial
incarceration has always focused on adverse legal and societal
consequences to the defendant, such as loss of witnesses, memories, and evidence, as well as disruption to employment, family
life, and the preparation of the defendant's case. 2 45 Pending criminal charges "may subject [the defendant] to public scorn and deprive him of employment, and almost certainly will force curtailment of his speech, associations and participation in unpopular
causes."246 In Klopfer v. North Carolina,the U.S. Supreme Court
held the prosecution violated the defendant's right to a speedy
trial by prolonging this oppression "as well as the 'anxiety and
concern accompanying public accusation.' ",247
However, out of whole cloth not darned by any binding precedent, the Montana Supreme Court cut a new swath of analysis by
requiring courts to examine the conditions of the defendant's incarceration as a factor under the oppressiveness prong of
prejudice. 2 48 This inquiry has never been recognized in any examination of prejudice in the entire line of federal jurisprudence regarding a defendant's speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment. 24 9 Thus, it is not surprising that little support can be garnered for such a proposition from either federal or Montana case
law.
244. State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 842 (Mont. 2007) (examining the (1) oppressiveness
of pretrial incarceration; (2) prolonged disruption of the defendant's life; and (3) impairment of the accused's ability to present an effective defense).
245. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532-33 (referring to the defendant's idleness resulting from the
"little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs" in jail).
246. Klopfer v. N.C., 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967).
247. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).
248. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 844.
249. See e.g. U.S. v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986) (recognizing that the right
does not shield a defendant from every expense or inconvenience; the core concern of the
speedy trial right is liberty); U.S. v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1982) (not reaching the
prejudice prong); U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-22 (1971) (not mentioning the conditions of confinement); Klopfer v.N.C., 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967) (focusing on legal and societal consequences).
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In requiring an examination into the "conditions of confinement," the Court cited Wells v. Petsock,2 50 a Third Circuit Court of
Appeals case denying a defendant's speedy trial claim, 2 5 1 as well
as State v. Johnson,2 52 a Montana Supreme Court decision that
held similarly. 2 53 However, Wells addressed the "conditions of
confinement" under Barker's length of delay factor, not
prejudice. 25 4 Such an analysis would seem to suggest that the
court focused on the defendant's liberty interest as the core concern of the speedy trial right, as closely related to the time spent
incarcerated prior to trial.
Second, Wells's only support for its determination that the
"conditions of confinement" were a proper focus for the speedy
trial analysis was an inferential reference to a dissenting opinion
in Ringstaff v. Howard,2 55 an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
case. 2 56 Ringstaff, in turn, inferentially relied on two cases for its
legal basis, 2 57 Dothard v. Rawlinson258 and Pugh v. Locke. 2 59 The
journey down this legal rabbit hole finally arrives at an intelligible
discovery-both Dothardand Pugh were civil actions. Dothardinvolved a Civil Rights Act suit by a female applicant denied employment as an Alabama State Penitentiary correctional counselor, 260 while Pugh involved a class action 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
suit by prisoners complaining about the Alabama Penitentiary's
conditions of confinement. 26 1 Dothard and Pugh serve as the indelible legal lesson: there are proper civil vehicles by which to
lodge complaints regarding violations of civil rights or, more importantly here, conditions of confinement.
The Montana Supreme Court's additional reliance on its own
precedent, State v. Johnson, was likewise misplaced and unavailing. The defendant in Johnson asserted that he had been denied
appropriate medical treatment while incarcerated prior to trial. 2 62
250. Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1991).
251. Id. at 257.
252. State v. Johnson, 4 P.3d 654 (Mont. 2000).
253. Id. at 674-75, 678 (considering and rejecting defendant's claims of inadequate medical attention under "oppressive pretrial incarceration" prong of prejudice factor).
254. Wells, 941 F.2d at 257.
255. Ringstaff v. Howard, 885 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1989).
256. Wells, 941 F.2d at 257 (citing Ringstaff,885 F.2d at 1548 (Johnson, J., dissenting)).
257. Ringstaff, 885 F.2d at 1548 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
258. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
259. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
260. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 323.
261. Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 321-22.
262. State v. Johnson, 4 P.3d 654, 660 (Mont. 2000).
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It was this medical treatment complaint that erroneously birthed
a "conditions of incarceration" focus. The Johnson Court had no
legal authority for such an inquiry; the analysis was entirely factual. Similarly, the Ariegwe Court cited no legal authority when
detailing the numerous possible conditions of incarceration that a
defendant may encounter, because none exists for such an inquiry
in this context. Such an analysis would be tenuous and marginally appropriate under a speedy trial examination only if it bore
some direct relation to the anxiety and concern suffered by the
defendant, thus demonstrating prejudice.
Ultimately, however, concern for the defendant's conditions of
incarceration has no place in the examination of a defendant's
speedy trial right. There is no legal or factual support for such
concern under the Sixth Amendment, and no case law compels the
analysis. Otherwise, defendants would be wise to assert they
were suffering distressing conditions of incarceration and compel
courts to conduct evidentiary hearings to determine whether these
claims are verifiable. The end result would be more delay, which
could likely be held against the State under Barker's analysis, as
well as a waste of time and resources for prosecutors and courts.
The Montana Supreme Court's addition of other considerations under the "oppressive pretrial incarceration" prong yielded
no better results. Ariegwe requires courts and practitioners to
also evaluate (1) the duration of the incarceration; (2) the complexity of the charged offense(s); and (3) any misconduct on the
part of the accused directly related to the pretrial incarceration. 26 3
The duration of the defendant's incarceration is the proper focus
for the oppressiveness of his incarceration. However, it is unclear
how the complexity of the charged offense relates to whether pretrial incarceration is oppressive or prejudicial to the defendant.
The Court's citation to Barker for this idea 26 4 is unpersuasive.
Barker discussed the complexity of the charge in relation to the
length of delay required to trigger the speedy trial inquiry, not
2 65
prejudice.
Likewise, the accused's misconduct is not relevant. The basic
idea propounded by the Court was that, if the defendant is incarcerated prior to trial because he is a flight risk, his incarceration
263. State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 843 (Mont. 2007).
264. Id. (citing Barker u. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972) (noting "the delay that can be
tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge")).
265. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31.
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is less likely to be oppressive, ostensibly because it was self-inflicted. 26 6 However, the reason for the defendant's pretrial incarceration-whether it be his propensity to flee or a financial inability to post bail-should not serve as a potential scapegoat for excessive pretrial delay. A defendant's right to a speedy trial could
arguably be violated despite the fact that he was incarcerated as a
flight risk. Hence, the proper focus of the "oppressive pretrial incarceration" inquiry is the duration of the incarceration.
The Montana Supreme Court, in attempting to clarify its
analysis, lost sight of this focus. It is again apparent why the
Barker Court enunciated a fluid test, balancing numerous factors
as they arose instead of trying to chart every conceivable
prejudice. Most importantly, Barker's own admonition was to
evaluate the four "related factors [and consider them] together
with such other circumstances as may be relevant. '2 67 The U.S.
Supreme Court was aware then that certain factors or circumstances would logically defy labels yet still be appropriate concerns under the speedy trial test.
b. Anxiety and Concern
The Montana Supreme Court aptly characterized the "anxiety
and concern" inquiry as "more subjective, not to mention difficult
to demonstrate," noting "[t]he [U.S.] Supreme Court has described
the interest . . . in relatively broad terms."2 68 In considering
Ariegwe's claim, the Montana Supreme Court struggled with the
difficult task of adequately addressing the critical and elusive distinction between disruption that is inherent in being charged with
a crime-and therefore acceptable-and that caused by undue delay in violation of the Sixth Amendment. With a sense of foreshadowing, the Court went to great lengths to emphasize that "a
certain amount of anxiety and concern is inherent in being accused of a crime," and the right to speedy trial serves to minimize,
2 69
not eliminate, that suffering.
Ariegwe presented several instances in which he claimed to
have suffered anxiety and concern due to pretrial delay, above and
beyond any suffering caused by the charges themselves. His relationship with his ex-wife, with whom he still resided, became
266.
267.
268.
269.

Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 843.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 (emphasis added).
Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 844.
Id. at 845.
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strained. 270 He testified that he felt compelled to resign from his
job as a youth counselor, and could not find similar employment
due to the pending charges. 271 He presented a letter from a licensed clinical social worker confirming that he "was experiencing
moderate to at times a severe level of anxiety."272
The Court, however, agreed with the district court's finding
that
the primary source of Ariegwe's anxiety and concern was the nature
of the charged offenses and . . .while the delay in bringing him to
trial had contributed somewhat to Ariegwe's anxiety and concern, it
did not substantially aggravate it ... to the extent warranting dis2 73
missal on that factor alone.

It is worrisome that the Montana Supreme Court adopted,

without comment, this problematic finding of the district court.
First, both the U.S. Supreme Court and Montana Supreme Court
have made clear that no one factor is dispositive, so Ariegwe's evidence of anxiety and concern was held to an erroneous standard if
the district court required it alone to warrant dismissal. Rather,
the fact that the delay did cause some of Ariegwe's concern should
have been factored into the overall balancing test. Thus, the district court's language is alarming because it suggests a misapplication of even Bruce. Nonetheless, the Court upheld the district
court's apportionment of Ariegwe's anxiety and concern as "not
2 74

clearly erroneous."
Second, a defendant's claim should not automatically fail just
because the "primary source" of his anxiety and concern is the
charges. Indeed, this will often be the case. From the start,
Ariegwe conceded that some of his anxiety and concern was attributable solely to the charges against him. 275 However, he argued
"there's a difference between being subject to these kinds of stressors in one's life for a period of 90 days or 180 days... and being
subjected to those stresses for a period of 380 days." 2 76 A defendant who suffers anxiety and concern due to the charges against
him suffers increasingly with each day that passes without the
charges being resolved. Thus, even absent particularized evidence
of anxiety and concern like that presented by Ariegwe, the defen270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 856-57.
Id. at 857.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 857-58 (emphasis added; internal quotations omitted).
Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 858.
Id. at 857.
Id.
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dant who is aware of the charges against him is entitled to a pre2 77
sumption of increasing anxiety and concern as delay continues.
The Court also declined to consider Ariegwe's evidence of anxiety suffered by his family, although its reason was not entirely
clear. The Court first noted that, in order to be relevant to
Ariegwe's argument of prejudice, the anxiety and concern suffered
by Ariegwe's wife and children would have had to affect him.
However, the Court never explained whether the evidence at issue
met this requirement, apparently because it determined that all
Ariegwe's evidence of anxiety and concern, including that suffered
by his family, resulted from the charges rather than an excessive
delay.
While the Court correctly noted that the speedy trial right
does not eliminate anxiety and concern, 278 it failed to give equal
credence to the flip side of its observation: the guarantee still
serves "to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the
presence of unresolved criminal charges." 2 79 Even if Ariegwe was
unable to show sufficient prejudice to succeed in his overall right
to speedy trial claim-as very well may have been the case-a
thorough right to speedy trial analysis required consideration of
the anxiety and concern suffered by the defendant as a result of
delay. This is true regardless of whether the defendant also suffered a great deal of anxiety and concern due to the charges. Even
though the Court agreed with Ariegwe that "anxiety and concern
caused by the nature of the charged offenses may be unduly prolonged in a given case," it summarily concluded that Ariegwe did
not demonstrate that happened here. 28 0 Given the Court's earlier
finding under the first factor that the length of the delay required
the State to "make a highly persuasive showing that Ariegwe was
not prejudiced by the delay,"28 1 it is interesting that the burden
seemed to end up on Mr. Ariegwe to show that the delay "substantially aggravate[d]" or "unduly prolonged" his anxiety and concern.

2 82

277. Cf Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992) (holding excessive delay creates a presumption that the defendant's ability to defend his case has been impaired).
278. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 857.
279. Id. (quoting U.S. v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982)) (emphasis in original; internal
quotations omitted).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 856.
282. Id. at 857-58.
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Impairment of the Defendant's Defense by the Delay

The final factor in the prejudice analysis, the impairment of
one's defense, has been described by the U.S. Supreme Court as
the "most serious . . . because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system."28 3 What began as an inquiry into the possible prejudice suffered by the defendant in the speedy trial context has diverged
into two conflicting analyses under federal law. One line of inquiry considers defense prejudice as one factor of the four to be
considered in assessing a defendant's speedy trial rights-a consideration important to, but not the sole purpose of, the speedy
trial right. 28 4 The second line of defense prejudice reasoning holds
that after a substantial passage of time, the presumption of
prejudice is so great that a defendant's right to a speedy trial has
25
been violated.
The first line of analysis-prejudice as one factor to be considered-began with Marion and continued through Barker, MacDonald, and Loud Hawk. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Marion
that inordinate delay may prejudice a defendant's ability to effectively challenge the Government's accusation. However, "the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite
apartfrom actual or possible prejudice to an accused's defense. "286
Further, the Court declared that the "possibility of prejudice at
trial is not itself sufficient reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment
from its proper context. Possible prejudice is inherent in any de28 7
lay, however short."
The Barker decision did nothing to change the prejudice analysis set forth in Marion, noting that "[p]rejudice, of course, should
be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the
speedy trial right was designed to protect."28 8 MacDonald provided perhaps the most pronounced endorsement of prejudice to
283. Barker v.Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
284. See U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; U.S. v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982); U.S. v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311 (1986).
285. Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 655-58 (1992).
286. Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added).
287. Id. at 322.
288. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Justice Thomas, in his dissent in Doggett, believed Barker
stood for the proposition that limiting the possibility of impairment to the accused's defense
"is an independent and fundamental objective of the Speedy Trial Clause," while Marion,
MacDonaldand Loud Hawk held it was not. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 662 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the defense as only one factor among several to consider in the
speedy trial analysis:
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is thus not primarily
intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of
time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause
and by statutes of limitation. The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to
trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment
of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to
by arrest and the presence of
shorten the disruption of life28caused
9
unresolved criminal charges.

Thus, it was settled law that prejudice to the defense, however
great, presumptive or otherwise, would be considered along with
the other factors set forth in Barker. This point was made particularly clear when the Court held that, after a five-year delay between arrest and trial, four years of which were attributable to the
prosecution's failures, Barker's right to a speedy trial had not
290
been violated.
Ten years after MacDonald, the Court modified its position on
the Sixth Amendment's fundamental liberty concern. In Doggett,
the Court held that the eight-and-a-half year delay between the
defendant's indictment and his arrest was so presumptively prejudicial to his case that it required reversal of his conviction and
sentence, despite no impairment of his liberty or demonstrable
prejudice. 2 9 1 The Court, in finding reversible presumptive
prejudice in Doggett, refused to acknowledge conflicting precedent. 29 2 Left without reconciliation, Doggett, as the most recent
pronouncement of prejudice in the context of the speedy trial
right, instructs that such presumptive prejudice can amount to an
independent and fundamental violation of the Sixth Amendment.
The Montana Supreme Court failed to explicitly adopt Doggett's holding. 29 3 Rather, Ariegwe cautioned courts that "consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable
[because] excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. '29 4 The Ariegwe Court emphasized the difficulty of
demonstrating damage to the fabric of the defendant's case, and
289. MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8.
290. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 536.
291. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657-58.
292. Id. at 662 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating "[tihe Court
refuses to acknowledge this conflict").
293. State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 845 n. 7 (Mont. 2007).
294. Id. at 846 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655) (internal quotations omitted).
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that "affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential
295
to every speedy trial claim."
Despite affirming the tenet that prejudice is not always demonstrable, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that
in the absence of affirmative proof that the delay has impaired the
accused's ability to present an effective defense, impairment must
be assessed based on other factors in the analysis-e.g., the length of
the delay .

. . ,

the accused's responses to the delay ....

and the

296
duration of the pretrial incarceration.
The conclusion appears to shirk Doggett's reasoning, instead
returning to the factor's analysis set forth in Barker and progeny. 297 By failing to account for a presumption of prejudice that
could evolve or intensify into fundamental prejudice, regardless of
the defendant's liberty interest, Ariegwe may violate Doggett.
However, the Montana Supreme Court's holding does comport
with the holdings and spirit of Marion, Barker, MacDonald, and
Loud Hawk, which focused on a defendant's liberty interest under
the speedy trial analysis. Time may tell whether a defendant in
Montana will experience such extraordinary delay that he or she
will seek refuge from the rains of delay under the umbrella of Doggett, regardless of incarceration or the other Barker factors. How
will the Montana Supreme Court treat such extraordinary delay
after Ariegwe?

5.

The BalancingAct

The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
Sixth Amendment as requiring courts to balance the four factors
of the right to speedy trial analysis in a sensitive, flexible, case-bycase analysis, regarding none of the factors as dispositive. 2 98 The
Montana Supreme Court in Ariegwe announced the same balancing approach requirement and compelled lower courts to weigh
the four factors by attributing varying significance to each factor
based on the unique facts and circumstances of each case. 2 9 9 By
295. Id. (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655) (internal quotations omitted).
296. Id. (emphasis added).
297. Id. at 829 (stating that "presuming prejudice based on nothing more than the
State's failure to prove the contrary is not, in our view, an accurate basis on which to evaluate a speedy trial claim").
298. See U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1971); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533
(1972); U.S. v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 (1986); Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651, 655-56
(adhering to the balancing approach, but holding that the presumptive prejudice was sufficient for reversal, and thus reasonably interpreted as dispositive).
299. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 847.
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requiring a balancing examination of the speedy trial factors, the
Montana Supreme Court escapes the obvious reaction to its "three
single-spaced pages" test: the Court has essentially created a
"checklist" for lower courts.
However, in the end, it is still up to trial courts to assign
weights to each factor and balance those factors in an inherently
case-by-case process that will surely differ from court to court. In
sum, it is puzzling why the Court went to such great lengths to
create such a detailed, structured analysis, when in the end the
factors are thrown back into a giant melting pot of individual
judgment, to be stirred and seasoned to the liking of the trial court
anyway. In a variation on the old saying, "six of one, half a dozen
of the other," it will be interesting to see whether the new test is
really an improvement, or simply a lot more work.
C.

How Ariegwe Could Violate a Defendant's Speedy Trial
Right under the Sixth Amendment

Perhaps the most troubling question raised by Ariegwe is
whether, in some instances, the rigid, detailed structure of the
right to speedy trial analysis required under Ariegwe could actually restrict a defendant's right to speedy trial beyond what the
U.S. Supreme Court envisioned under the Sixth Amendment and
Barker. Could a defendant's speedy trial claim succeed under a
fluid, true balancing test such as that set forth in Barker, while
simultaneously failing under a mechanical test like Ariegwe? If
so, the Ariegwe test is unconstitutional.
The Montana Supreme Court encountered a similar predicament less than two years ago, involving another fundamental due
process right. Twenty-five years ago, the Montana Supreme
Court adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test 30 0 set forth
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates,30 1 to determine
whether probable cause existed to justify issuance of a search warrant. In doing so, the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that
Gates's "totality of the circumstances approach" was preferable to
"any rigid demand that specific tests be satisfied by every inform-

ant's

tip."302

300. State v. Kelly, 668 P.2d 1032, 1045 (Mont. 1983) (citing Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
231 (1983)).
301. Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
302. Kelly, 668 P.2d at 1044 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31 (emphasis added; internal quotations omitted)).
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However, almost twenty years later, in State v. Reesman,30 3
the Court decided to augment the probable cause analysis with
"certain indelible threshold rules [that] have emerged." 30 4 The
Court again acknowledged the fluid principle of the Gates test, but
30 5
proceeded nonetheless to set forth a "step-by-step analysis."
This analysis included a requirement that anonymous tips be in30 6
dependently corroborated by police.
While the Court's attempt to simplify practitioners' work was
commendable, it was not long before a case came before the Court
that illustrated the problem with reading too much into a constitutional due process rights analysis. In State v. Barnaby,30 7 "police receive[d] reliable reports from several concerned citizens yet
no single report satisfie[d] all the Reesman criteria." 30 The Court
reluctantly overruled its Reesman requirement regarding independent police corroboration, 30 9 explaining:
[W]e cannot easily reconcile Reesman's strict rules ... with the flex-

ibility of the totality of the circumstances test. Probable cause poses
a fluid concept turning on the assessment of probabilities in a particular factual context, "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
3 10
neat set of legal rules."
Thus, the Court implicitly acknowledged that Reesman's overspecificity was unconstitutional and abandoned it in favor of a
broader, more flexible interpretation.
The Ariegwe Court's right to speedy trial analysis is discomfortingly reminiscent of its well-intentioned but ultimately problematic efforts in Reesman. As discussed above, it is simply not
clear that all the subfactors set forth by the Court are a required
part of every analysis. Some subfactors, such as the conditions of
the defendant's incarceration, may rarely be appropriate in any
analysis, 3 1 1 while the Court rejected other subfactors, such as
anxiety and concern suffered by the defendant's family, that could
3 12
be relevant to a defendant's claim.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
ted).
311.
312.

State v. Reesman, 10 P.3d 83 (Mont. 2000).
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
State v. Barnaby, 142 P.3d 809 (Mont. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 818 (quoting Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)) (internal quotations omitSupra nn. 249-50 and accompanying text.
Supra n. 276 and accompanying text.
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Notably, the Court in Ariegwe did not say the factors it set
forth were the only ones that could be considered-in fact, it expressly acknowledged Barker's warning that the factors are not
exclusive and none are dispositive. 3 13 However, the Court's elucidation of a test with such specificity increases the likelihood that
practitioners will view the doctrine through the lens of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius,31 4 mistakenly assuming that what was
not expressly stated was intentionally excluded and irrelevant.
The temptation to pigeonhole facts into the three-page outline
may be too great for some to resist. Such an intricate test, by its
very nature, will hinder the ability of courts and practitioners to
conduct a fluid speedy trial analysis that is responsive to the facts
and circumstances at hand.
Unfortunately, such rigid compartmentalization and preordained analysis may also hinder some defendants' speedy trial
claims. Such a situation may not be readily apparent, but, then
again, the Reesman Court probably did not contemplate the
unique facts of Mr. Barnaby's situation until his case was before
them. It is not impossible to imagine a hypothetical situation in
which a defendant's right to speedy trial claim could succeed
under Barker's four factors, but would not survive Ariegwe's threepage outline. Mr. Ariegwe himself provides a suitable fact scenario for exploring this possibility, and one that is already familiar.
Under Barker, Mr. Ariegwe's speedy trial claim might have
succeeded. The only factor the Court found to weigh against
Ariegwe's claim was Factor Four, regarding whether the trial delay prejudiced Ariegwe. 31 5 Assuming arguendo the first three factors remained in his favor, a successful showing of prejudice under
the fourth factor would have necessarily tipped the entire analysis
in his favor. Of the three interests protected under Factor Fouroppressive pretrial incarceration, impairment of defense, and pretrial anxiety and concern-the Court (and Ariegwe) considered
only the third interest of pretrial anxiety and concern to be at issue. 31 6 More specifically, the question was whether the delay
caused Ariegwe to suffer anxiety and concern due to "the presence
of unresolved criminal charges." 31 7 It is also important to keep in
313. State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 847 (Mont. 2007).
314. Black's Law Dictionary 620 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004) (defining the
term as "[a] canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the
exclusion of the other, or of the alternative").
315. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 858.
316. Id. at 856.
317. Id.
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mind that the Court had already concluded that, based on the
length of delay under Factor One, the State had to "make a highly
persuasive showing that Ariegwe was not prejudiced by the delay,
while the quantum of proof that may be expected of Ariegwe... is
3 18
correspondingly lower."
Despite having relatively clear guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme Court unnecessarily, and
perhaps unconstitutionally, narrowed the gauntlet for Ariegwe's
claim. First, although the Court acknowledged that "the delay in
this case somewhat aggravated the anxiety and concern that are
inherent in being accused of a crime," it rejected as insufficient
Ariegwe's evidence in that regard. 3 19 With little explanation, the
Court indicated the delay had to be the "primary source" 3of
20
Ariegwe's anxiety and concern, and decided it was not.
Granted, Ariegwe could not show oppressive pretrial incarceration
or impairment to his defense. However, these are interests the
speedy trial right is intended to protect, 32 1 not requirements a de32 2
fendant must fulfill.
As explained above, the Montana Supreme Court also never
considered the evidence of anxiety and concern suffered by
Ariegwe's family. 3 23 Ariegwe presented evidence that his relationship with his ex-wife, with whom he still resided, became
strained. 3 24 She testified at the speedy trial hearing that she was
unable to sleep due to anxiety and fear for her family. 32 5 Indeed,
their child was "taunted at school." 3 26 Ariegwe also waited under
the threat of possible deportation to Nigeria, which would mean
separation from his children, 32 7 a possibility that would create
anxiety and concern in the family as a whole. However, based
upon its conclusion that these pieces of evidence were irrelevant,
the Court never considered them.
By considering Ariegwe's claim under an even slightly more
rigorous test, the Montana Supreme Court restricted his right to
318. Id.
319. Id. at 858.
320. Id.
321. U.S. v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
322. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (holding no one factor is "necessary or
sufficient" to dispose of a defendant's speedy trial claim); Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 847 (holding
"none of the foregoing four factors is either a necessary or a sufficient condition").
323. Id. at 857.
324. Id. at 856-57.
325. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d at 857.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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speedy trial beyond that contemplated by the Sixth Amendment
as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. In determining
whether Ariegwe experienced undue anxiety and concern awaiting trial, the U.S. Supreme Court might have considered evidence
of anxiety and concern experienced not only by Ariegwe but his
friends and family as well, to the extent it affected Ariegwe. It
would have looked at the evidence of anxiety and concern with
regard to the length of delay, not necessarily with regard to
whether it would have happened anyway given the charges
against Ariegwe. The "intensifying presumption of prejudice"
would have required the State to shoulder the burden of showing
the delay did not prejudice Ariegwe. The U.S. Supreme Court
might also have considered other relevant factors beyond the four
outlined in Barker. While it is impossible to know for certain
whether Ariegwe's speedy trial claim would have succeeded under
the Sixth Amendment, even a slightly broader analysis under the
"anxiety and concern" prong of Factor Four could well have had a
domino effect, tipping this factor, and thus the entire analysis, in
Ariegwe's favor.
D.

The Right to Speedy Trial Post-Ariegwe: What Can
PractitionersReally Expect?

The few right to speedy trial appeals that have been considered by the Montana Supreme Court following Ariegwe provide
limited guidance. Two such cases have come before the Court:
State v. Billman3 28 and State v. Smith. 3 29 In both, the Court declined to hear the defendants' speedy trial claims, explaining in
summary fashion that because the defendants briefed their claims
prior to issuance of Ariegwe, it was appropriate to remand the
330
claims to the district courts.
Justice Nelson dissented from both remand orders, explaining
several concerns in Billman. First, he pointed out that the Court
did not need to remand the speedy trial issue in the case because
the Court had a sufficient trial record before it to decide whether
the defendant's right to speedy trial was violated. 3 3 1 Second, he
noted that the Court did not need to remand because it reviews a
question of constitutional law, like the right to speedy trial, de
328.
329.
330.
331.

State v. Biliman, No. 06-0753 (Mont. Nov. 7, 2007).
State v. Smith, 176 P.3d 258 (Mont. 2008).
Id. at 262; Or. at 1, State v. Billman, No. 06-0753 (Mont. Nov. 7, 2007).
Or. at 3, State v. Billman, No. 06-0753 (Mont. Nov. 7, 2007).
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novo anyway. 3 3 2 Third, he pointed to the fact that the State had
requested the Court to perform a speedy trial analysis in this case
like it did in Ariegwe.3 33 Fourth, Justice Nelson argued that remanding the case would simply prolong final resolution of the defendant's claim and waste further time and resources. 33 4 Fifth, he
took issue with the Court's failure to provide any justification for
its decision to remand, beyond merely" 'deem[ing] it appropriate'
to do so." 3 35 He argued that Ariegwe provided ample authority for
336
the Court to have taken a similar course of action in Billman.
Finally, he argued that the Court's remand of the case to the district "needlessly hamper[ed] the State's legitimate interest in
prosecuting the charges . . . and infringe[d] Billman's constitutional rights." 33 7 Justice Nelson, in his dissent from the Court's
remand order in Smith, simply stated he dissented for the same
3 38
reasons he dissented from the remand order in Billman.
Justice Nelson rightfully points out several troubling inconsistencies between the Court's treatment of Ariegwe and its treatment of Billman and Smith. However, it is Ariegwe that appears
to be the aberration. Following the Court's prior renovation of the
right to speedy trial analysis in City of Billings v. Bruce, it had to
339
consider a right to speedy trial claim-State v. Hardaway that had been briefed under its pre-Bruce analysis. In Hardaway,
the Court remanded the speedy trial claim for reconsideration
under Bruce, explaining "that the District Court and the parties
did not, at the time [the defendant] moved for a dismissal based 3on
40
lack of speedy trial, have the benefit of the Bruce decision."
Likewise, in Ariegwe, neither the parties nor the lower court had
the opportunity to consider Ariegwe's motion under the test set
forth in Ariegwe. 34 1 Although the Court did have a well-developed
factual record before it in Ariegwe,342 there is no evidence that it
lacked such a record in Hardaway,Billman, or Smith, and yet it
remanded those cases to the district court for rehearing under the
newly effective law.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Or. at 6, State v. Billman, No. 06-0753 (Mont. Nov. 7, 2007).
State v. Smith, 176 P.3d 258, 262 (Mont. 2008).
State v. Hardaway, 966 P.2d 125 (Mont. 1998).
Id. at 127.
State v. Ariegwe, 167 P.3d 815, 851 (Mont. 2007).
Id. at 852.
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It is unclear which approach, if either, is correct, because the
Court does not provide legal justification for either approach in
any of the four cases. Rather, the decision whether to remand appears to be based on practical considerations in each case. Thus,
Justice Nelson's criticism that the Court remanded in Billman
and Smith solely because remand was "appropriate" applies
equally to the reasoning behind the Court's decision not to remand
in Ariegwe. It justified that decision on two grounds: (1) the factual record was well-developed; and (2) the revised test was so different from Bruce that courts and litigants would not be able to
correctly apply the test unless the Court illustrated its use by ap34 3
plying it to Ariegwe's claim.
However, neither ground provides legal authority for doing
the trial court's job. In addition, application of the analysis is so
dependent upon the facts of each case that illustrating its application in one case hardly ensures its uniform application thereafter.
Regardless of whether the Court's lengthy, detailed analysis of
Ariegwe's claim was a prudent use of its judicial time and resources, Billman and Smith indicate the Court has returned to
remanding speedy trial appeals briefed prior to Ariegwe, even
where the factual record before the Court is well-developed.
As for future cases to be analyzed under Ariegwe, practitioners will find the three-page outline provided by the Court to be a
good starting point and would be wise to cover their bases by addressing all factors and subfactors to the extent possible and relevant, given the factual circumstances of the case. However, the
outline provided by the Court may give practitioners and lower
courts a false sense of security by suggesting that one need only
follow the template provided, in a sort of paint-by-number approach to analyzing whether a defendant's right to speedy trial
has been violated. In actuality, the required analysis may be
much more complex and may add factors to, or remove factors
from, those provided in the outline. It must be remembered that
the factors provided in this outline, and in Ariegwe in general, are
not an exhaustive list. Nor will every factor be relevant in every
case. Thus, practitioners and courts must use the outline as a
guide to, rather than the final word on, analysis of a defendant's
right to speedy trial.
Considering the length and complexity of the right to speedy
trial test the Montana Supreme Court has set forth, it will be in343. Id.
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teresting to see whether the bar and the bench will turn to the
Montana Legislature for a solution. Some states have enacted
their own versions of the Federal Speedy Trial Act, providing specific and relatively short timeframes for prosecuting a defendant's
case in state court. 344 Of course, such legislation is not without
potential ramifications, including increased court dockets and
caseloads, not to mention the fiscal impacts of such increases.
However, faced with the daunting task of deciphering Ariegwe,
practitioners and judges alike may seek the clarity that a legislative rule can provide, despite its drawbacks.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Justice Powell observed in Barker v. Wingo that the right to
speedy trial serves two competing interests-the defendant's interest in receiving a speedy trial and society's interest in ensuring
the defendant receives one. 34 5 Among the factors and subfactors
elucidated by the Court in Barker, there is no indication the Court
intended for considerations like clarity and ease of application to
exert a shaping force upon courts' analysis of this fundamental
right. However, that is exactly what has happened in Montana.
The tension between preserving the "vague" and "amorphous"
quality of this right and quantifying it into a sort of productionline analysis has proved too great, and Ariegwe is the result.
It is always tempting to take what is vague and make it clear,
especially if it means achieving uniformity and ease of application
and consistency of results. However, such structure necessarily
entails a certain amount of rigidity, which, if too great, can have
the undesirable effect of suffocating justice. The amount of detail
the Court has added to its right to speedy trial analysis may cause
its efforts to miss their mark. This is especially true where that
detail is unnecessary, insufficiently supported by legal authority,
or based on a misinterpretation of the authority that does exist.
Certainly, the shift from a step-by-step analysis to a balancing approach better reflects the approach envisioned by Barker.
However, Ariegwe ultimately shifted the focus of right to speedy
trial analysis from the ideals the right was meant to preserve to a
344. See e.g. Illinois Speedy Trial Act, 725 Ill. Compiled Stat. 5/103-5 (2007) (requiring
trial within 120 days of arrest or, for defendants released on bail or recognizance, within
160 days of defendant's demand for trial); Colorado Speedy Trial Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 181-405 (Lexis 2007) (requiring trial within 6 months of entry of a guilty plea); Missouri
Speedy Trial Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 545.780 (2007).
345. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
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checklist of compartmentalized factors. That shift invokes the
worries expressed by Justice Thomas over fifteen years ago, in his
dissent from the U.S. Supreme Court's right to speedy trial opinion in Doggett:
Our constitutional law has become ever more complex in recent decades. That is, in itself, a regrettable development, for the law
draws force from the clarity of its command and the certainty of its
application. As the complexity of legal doctrines increases, moreover, so too does the danger that their foundational principles will
become obscured. I fear that danger has been realized here. So engrossed is the Court in applying the multifactor balancing test set
forth in Barker that it loses sight of the nature and purpose of the
speedy trial guarantee set forth in the Sixth Amendment. . 34.. 6
Barker's factors now appear to have taken on a life on their own.

346. Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 645, 669-70 (1992) (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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